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Abstract 
Over the past decade, new types of business incubation have been developed. One 
particularly prominent example is company builders, which use their own resources 
to build up companies, establishing numerous companies in a series. In doing so, 
this investor type facilitates internal and external business ideas. It offers a new or-
ganizational solution that combines both the innovative capacity of founders and the 
financial resources of a large company with the desire for long-term employment and 
corporate affiliation. This article examines the economic impact of company builders 
in Germany compared with other venture capital (VC) investor types on the basis of 
employment trends in the portfolio companies from 2011 to 2015. It is shown that 
company builders promote more dynamic employment growth than do other types of 
investors. This finding suggests that this type of investor is particularly well positioned 
to take advantage of the institutional deficiency in the German VC market. The re-
sults are also discussed in the context of the growth of the Berlin-based VC and start-
up ecosystem.  
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1 Introduction 
Traditionally, business incubation has been associated with government-provided support for start-ups 
based on a combination of finance, knowledge and infrastructure (Allen and McKluskey 1990; Phan, 
Mian, and Lamine 2016). Over the last ten years, new forms of private incubators have emerged that 
combine these elements in new ways (Hansen et al. 2000; Bendig, Evers, and Knirsch 2013; Dee et 
al. 2015). At least two major trends can be identified that have laid the foundation for a new player in 
incubation finance – the so-called company builder. The first trend is related to programs launched by 
accelerators that provided support to start-ups for a limited amount of time. Examples of internationally 
recognized accelerators are Y Combinator, TechStars, Seedcamp and Startupbootcamp.  A second 
trend is the serialization and institutionalization of support activities for forming new firms, including 
such diverse contributions as software programming, human resources and marketing. This phenom-
enon has been referred to as “start-up studio”, “start-up factory” or “venture builder” (Szigeti 2016); 
however, we refer to these players as company builders. Although the concept of company builders 
was pioneered in the United States (e.g. the Idealab, founded in 1996), these types of incubators ap-
pear to be gaining traction outside the US (Szigeti 2015).  
The performance of various types of venture capital (VC) investors has been relatively well document-
ed, yet few studies have addressed the role of company builders in particular. An important reason for 
the lack of empirical results concerning company builders may be related to data restrictions. For both 
classic and public VC firms and start-ups, there are incentives to make information regarding equity 
investment decisions available to the public. In part, such decisions are made public owing to regulato-
ry requirements, as a part of the disclosure requirements to investors or as a signal to competition. At 
the same time, start-ups represent independent ventures about which information is reported in a 
range of databases. However, with respect to company builders, the financing and growth of start-ups 
take place within an overarching corporation that may bundle various start-ups under one roof. Often 
financial information is reported only in consolidated financial statements, which is why information 
about individual start-up firms is not available. This lack of disclosure tends to change as start-ups 
grow, raise additional external finance and prepare to exit, at which time the company builder’s equity 
stakes are reduced.  
Company builders seem to be particularly well established in the German VC market. In part, this re-
sult may be attributed to the success of Rocket Internet, the largest company builder worldwide. On 
the one hand, Rocket Internet has engaged in several successful and large exits; on the other hand, 
several former Rocket employees launched their own company builder after leaving the firm. Their 
business model was also imitated by other investors. Against this backdrop, we compared the corpo-
rate performance of company builder–backed start-ups with the performance of start-ups that received 
financing from other types of investors. Given the political and economic importance of employment in 
young ventures, we used the growth of these firms as the benchmark in measuring their performance.  
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This study is structured as follow. First, in section 2, we discuss company builders as a new investor 
type. Section 3 provides an overview of company builder activity in Germany, and on this basis, we 
derived hypotheses as described in section 4. In sections 5 and 6, respectively, the data sources are 
introduced and the descriptive and regression results are reported. In section 7, we summarize our 
findings and draw some conclusions.  
 
2 The Development of Business Incubation 
Business incubation refers to institutionalized support for new ventures in which support for new 
firms may bundle various different activities (Allen and McCluskey 1990, 62; Aernoudt 2004, 128; 
Hackett and Dilts 2004, 57, 79). This broad definition thus includes such varied organizations as busi-
ness incubators, technology parks and co-working spaces; however, we use a more narrow definition 
of business incubation that distinguishes between different types of incubators. Here, we refer to busi-
ness incubation as a form of VC finance that comprises four functions (Engelmann 2000, 331–332; 
Brettel, Rudolf and Witt 2005, 136–137): (1) non-financial support is provided (office spaces and 
commercial facilities, communication infrastructure); (2) advice is provided in specific fields, including 
management, legal affairs, taxes, software, human resources and technological development; (3) 
start-ups benefit from the company builder’s network of suppliers and customers’ investors ; and (4) 
new ventures receive equity finance from company builders. 
This definition clearly distinguishes company builders from the more traditional types of VC fi-
nance, because the latter provide only limited consulting and brokerage services. Also, business an-
gels are not subsumed under this definition, because these players tend to concentrate on providing 
consulting and brokerage activities. Moreover, classic technology parks that focus on providing office 
space and commercial sites are also exempt from this definition, because they typically do not engage 
in the financing of new ventures. Although business incubation is a reaction to the high level of com-
plexity associated with the process of creating and growing new firms (OECD 1999), the provision of 
additional finance becomes necessary only under specific circumstances. Typically, this includes fast-
cycle industry environments characterized by rapid technological advancement in which traditional 
finance is not appropriate. Business incubation is most promising in environments where time is the 
major constraining factor, and thus first-mover advantages play an important role. In these situations, 
business incubation may allow start-ups to rapidly progress along the learning curve, enabling them to 
considerably reduce the time to market.  
The concept business incubation originated in the publicly financed science and technology 
parks in the US (Mian 2016, 6) for which such funding augmented the classic support functions in 
terms of infrastructure, consulting and brokerage. The first noteworthy number of private incubators 
was reported in the 1970s; later, corporations adopted the practice of business incubation in the form 
of corporate incubation. In the 1990s, the information and communication sector attracted major levels 
of funding. First and foremost, this sector comprised internet-based services that provided network 
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goods associated with particularly high first-mover advantages. With the emergence of the New Econ-
omy between 1995 and 2001, a new investor type gained traction, the so-called “networked incuba-
tors” (Hansen et al. 2000; Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005; Bruneel et al. 2012, 112). Hansen et al. (2000, 
76) showed that these investors focused in particular on internet-based services and central locations, 
which enabled these start-ups to access internal and external networks. A novel element associated 
with the networked incubator was the more comprehensive internalization of business functions. The 
investors supported start-ups in recruitment, controlling and marketing and also provided financial 
resources in these areas. The success of this institutional innovation led to the first substantial in-
crease in the number of private incubators (Leblebici and Shah 2004, 368). These investors were also 
observed in Germany (Achleitner and Engel 2001). As a late adopter of this investment model, Ger-
many was under considerable pressure during the crash of the Neuer Markt, a high-tech segment of 
the stock exchange that had been launched in Germany in 1997. As a consequence, the number of 
incubators, as well as the funds and support functions they provided, decreased considerably in the 
years that followed (Witt and Zilmer 2002; Brettel, Rudolf, and Witt 2005).  
The decline in these new investors was also discernible in other countries. Starting in 2004, 
stabilization of the information and communications technology (ICT) market (Web 2.0) led to a re-
newed surge in incubators, while at the same time they learned from past blunders. Accelerators place 
a strong emphasis on specific contents over a relatively short time frame. The support provided to 
start-ups in the form of business and technical consulting is highly structured and standardized and is 
limited to a period of a few weeks or months. With respect to finance, seed financing of no more than 
a few thousand US dollars is commonly provided (Miller and Bound 2011, 9). Accelerators often struc-
ture their programs to include selection procedures, courses with a limited number of participants and 
a final presentation with potential investors (“Demo Day”). Additional support activities that are availa-
ble first and foremost in established start-up hubs include, among other things, seminars that cover 
new firm formation, start-up weekends and founder’s roundtables.  
Compared with accelerators, company builders provide start-ups with a considerably more ex-
tensive portfolio of services. These investors make available a substantially larger amount of re-
sources for the growth of firms and deploy these resources to various start-ups simultaneously (Rao 
2013). The experience of successful entrepreneurs becomes institutionalized within these organiza-
tions, thus enabling the founders to progress more rapidly along the learning curve. Learning takes 
place not only between the company-builder team and the start-ups, but also between the portfolio 
firms within the organization. Because this approach to supporting the growth of young firms is asso-
ciated with high costs, company builders seek comprehensive control of the start-up process, which is 
often achieved in the form of majority stakes. The term “start-up studios” refers to film studios and 
illustrates that both proprietary projects and projects brought into the organization from the outside 
may be pursued using the existing infrastructure. However, company builders launch more business 
ideas and strategies internally than do other types of investors. Copycat strategies represent an ex-
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treme form of this phenomenon and include the cloning of existing business models aimed at increas-
ing performance.  
Thus, the strategies of both accelerators and company builders minimize the typical problem of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard associated with the launch of new firms, albeit in different 
ways. In the accelerator model, uncertainty and risk remain on the side of the start-up owing to the 
relatively small investments. Accelerators reduce some of the uncertainty within the start-up process 
by passing it on to the investor in the next phase. By contrast, company builders accept a much great-
er risk (or even the entire risk) while at the same time assuming full control of the start-up-process. 
Between these extremes, there are additional investors. Often such investors offer a broader portfolio 
of support activities than do regular VC firms, such as providing the premises for the start-up; howev-
er, they tend not to engage in capital-intensive functions to finance the expansion of young firms. 
These (empirically rare) investors are referred to as “traditional incubators” and will be compared with 
company builders, accelerators and classic VC investors (see Table 1). 
The first wave of the different types of incubation finance sketched out here was pioneered in the 
1990s and after 2005 in the United States. However, after 2010 at the latest, incubation finance began 
to expand internationally. At the same time, however, the launch of incubator firms stagnated in the 
United States (Miller and Bound 2011; Szigeti 2015). Against this backdrop, it is necessary to clarify 
which institutional context is most appropriate for incubation finance.  
 
Table 1: Different Types of Incubation Funding, as compared with Classic Venture Capital Investors  
 Venture Capital Incubation Funding 
Accelerator Traditional In-
cubator 
Company 
Builder 
Conception Finance and 
know-how 
Training camp Comprehensive 
support, 
including busi-
ness premises 
Internal control 
or majority stake 
in new venture 
Duration Life of fund Days to months Several years Several years 
Compensation Equity Fee or equity Equity Majority stake or 
complete inter-
nalization 
Support 
financing  
√ √ √ √ 
Coaching √ √ √ √ 
Network integration √ √ √ √ 
Business premises   √ √ 
ICT infrastructure   √ √ 
IT and programming     √ 
Marketing    √ 
Recruitment    √ 
Objective for exit Next investment 
phase 
Presentation to 
potential inves-
tors 
Long-term own-
ership (strategic 
investor, IPO) 
Long-term own-
ership (strategic 
investor, IPO) 
IPO = initial public offering; IT = information technology.  
Source: Author.  
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Hansen et al. (2000, 84) refer to “networked incubators” as a novel and superior organizational form 
because they combine the resources of large corporations with the agility of start-ups. It is thus ex-
pected that accelerators and company builders represent successful institutional innovations in the 
networked society (Leblebici and  Shah 2004, 369). In contrast to previous organizational forms, incu-
bation finance not only includes the support of business ideas but also is associated with serializing 
the launch of new firms (Bendig, Evers, and Knirsch 2013, 81). In doing so, the new venture creation 
process becomes replicable based on standardized modules. Although accelerators tend to provide 
the general tools for the start-up process, company builders engage in the strategic development of a 
company. The business idea is thus the scarce resource, which illustrates the limits related to incuba-
tion finance. With the entry of company builders, entrepreneurs must cede control of much of their 
venture. It may thus be assumed that company builders are more attractive to founders within ecosys-
tems where financial and entrepreneurial resources are not widely available and where technological 
change is rapid. By contrast, if such resources are not lacking, traditional VC investments that have a 
considerably more nimble service portfolio may be more appropriate. Company builders may thus be 
expected to be more effective in specific innovation systems and sectoral contexts. 
 
3 Company Building in Germany  
An assessment of the different forms of incubation finance that are sketched out here is available only 
in the form of explorative studies (Miller and Bound 2011; Salido, Sabás, and Freixas 2013; Szigeti 
2015). These studies link the high rates of new-firm formation to incubation finance in Europe in the 
years 2010 and 2013. Germany also experienced a boom during these two years with respect to the 
availability of VC finance and the formation of incubators (Heimlich 2013; Bendig, Evers, and Knirsch 
2013, 80–87; Garbs 2014; Kahl and Scheuplein 2016, 31–33). In the year 2013, which marks a peak 
in this development, established firms increasingly engaged in incubation finance by launching their 
own corporate accelerators, and this trend is ongoing (Kawohl, Rack, and Strniste 2015). 
The surge in private company builder activity is strongly associated with the formation of Rocket Inter-
net in the year 2007. The history of this particular company builder may be traced back to the year 
1999 (Kaczmarek 2014; Schimoroszik 2015, 117–120). As a consequence of the rapid growth of se-
lected start-ups, as well as of several successful exits, other company builders were formed, including 
Team Europe (2008), HitFox (2011), Rheingau Founders (2011), M Cube (2011) and Project A Ven-
tures (2012). In this context, local knowledge transfer, as well as direct linkages among and continui-
ties of personnel, have played an important role. In Munich, Hamburg and Cologne, a smaller number 
of new company builders were also formed. However, in 2013, the company builder business model 
faced its first crisis, when several company builders had to narrow their portfolios or adjust their strat-
egies (Hofmann 2013; Kroker 2014). Although Rocket Internet, which had strongly emphasized a cop-
ycat strategy (Rooney 2012), was adversely affected by such turbulence, this firm was able to contin-
ue its development towards becoming a major global internet concern (Kaczmarek 2014, 265–321). 
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Subsequently, company building activity stabilized. In addition, further company builders were created 
with a focus on particular sectors (e.g. financial technology [“fintech”]). In 2016, a total of 20 company 
builders were identified in Germany.  
The growth of company builders occurred against the backdrop of a weak VC market in Germany 
(Kulicke 2012; Röhl 2014). The descriptive results reported here show that the publicly available VC 
funding attributable to company builders (i.e. Rocket Internet in particular) amounted to €1.2bn. The 
VC funding invested by company builders was thus twice as high as the amount attributable to private 
investors (InvestEurope/PEREP Analytics 2016). Compared with the US, the catch-up process of 
Germany’s VC market seems to be closely tied to company builders, and some characteristics of this 
business model seem to be particularly well suited to well-known elements of the German innovation 
system (Keck 1993; Allen 2010; Schmoch, Rammer, and Legler 2010), as follows: 
• In Germany, innovation tends to be implemented by methods that involve incremental 
change. Such strengths – including a detail-orientated, collaborative and rapid approach – 
may be deployed in applying innovations derived from the information and communication 
sector to different industries.  
• The method-based approach prevalent in the German innovation system facilitates the se-
quential reproduction of business models. From this perspective, the copycat strategy seems 
to be particularly promising.  
• Highly qualified individuals willing to cede some of their entrepreneurial self-determination are 
essential for the company builder business model. The high prestige afforded to long-term 
employment and large corporations seems to benefit company builders as well.  
All these factors indicate that among the various alternatives for launching and funding new firms 
(Kulicke 2012, 27–33), company builders seem to be particularly promising.     
 
4 Current State of Research and Hypotheses 
Assessing the employment effects of VC investments is a well-developed field of inquiry (e.g. Da Rin, 
Hellmann, and Puri 2013: 633pp.). Both microeconomic effects (Engel 2002; Achleitner and Kloeckner 
2005) and macroeconomic effects (Belke, Fehn, and Foster 2006; Feldmann 2010) associated with 
VC investments have been reported for the German labour market. The investment strategies of dif-
ferent types of VC investors have also been compared (Bertoni, Colombo, and Grilli 2013; Bertoni, 
Colombo, and Quas 2015). The initial studies dealt with business incubation in a general sense (Gri-
maldi and Grandi 2005; Stokan, Thompson, and Mahu 2015; Mian 2016, 12–17), whereas the specific 
type of incubation funding examined here has not (to our knowledge) been investigated in any previ-
ous study.  
In our study, we focused on the two extremes of incubation funding, combining the accelerators with 
the empirically few cases of traditional incubation.  
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As company builders provide a substantially more comprehensive set of support activities to their port-
folio firms, we expect more dynamic employment growth among these firms compared with companies 
that did not receive such funding (Hypothesis 1).  
Given the considerably higher amount of financial resources used in company builders to facilitate the 
development of their portfolio firms, as compared with accelerators, we would expect company builder 
firms to exhibit considerably higher employment growth rates than the latter types of VC investors 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Over the past five years, Berlin has witnessed rapid growth in the availability of VC finance, becoming 
the most important hub for VC in Germany (Scheuplein, Görtz, and Henke 2014). We tested whether 
firms operating in Berlin generally exhibited higher growth rates compared with firms outside Berlin, or 
whether firms in company builders grew more dynamically. We expected Berlin-based start-ups in 
company builders to be positively associated with firm growth, whereas no such relationship would be 
observed for firms that did not receive funding from a Berlin-based company builder (Hypothesis 3).   
Although VC and incubation activity is observed in various industries, investors tend to favour specific 
industries. In the time period of our study, VC and incubation funding concentrated on the digital 
economy, in which the first-mover advantages sketched out above are of substantial importance. The 
acquisition of finance could thus play a decisive role for the employment growth of start-ups. There-
fore, we expected the information and communication industry, as well as electronic commerce (e-
commerce), to be particularly well-suited targets for company building activities, which is why we ex-
pected the firms operating in these industries to be positively associated with growth (i.e. exhibiting the 
highest growth rates) (Hypothesis 4). 
 
5 Methods 
5.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database Zephyr (Bureau 
van Dijk) and Deal News (Majunke Consulting). Both databases were integrated and extended by 
the deal monitor of VentureCapital Magazin (an industry magazine reporting on German and Eu-
ropean VC activity and deals). Information on VC activity in the years 2011 to 2015, as well as 
German portfolio firms and investors, was retrieved from these sources. In total, 1,236 portfolio 
firms were identified in these years. Additional information regarding the VC-backed firms (num-
ber of employees, German industry code, location) was accessed via the Markus database, 
which is operated by Creditreform and the Bureau van Dijk. Using this database, we also deter-
mined whether the portfolio firms were active. In total, 322 portfolio firms were identified. Exits in 
the form of insolvencies, takeovers and IPOs were documented as well. In order to classify the 
different types of investors, we used the Zephyr database as well as the Fund Manager Profiles 
database operated by Preqin. This allowed us to distinguish four types of investors: company 
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builder, private accelerators, public VC firms and private VC firms. The empirically rare public 
accelerators were subsumed under the category public VC firms. While the first three types of 
investors were distinguished on the basis of a positive list, the fourth category of private VC in-
cludes classic VC firms and VC subsidiaries of investment banks as well as corporate VC firms, 
family offices and business angels. 
 
5.2 Regression Model 
The determinants of employment growth in VC-backed firms and in start-ups that received incu-
bation funding were examined on the basis of four regression models. For the dependent variable 
in models 1 and 2, we used employment growth (EMPL_GROW) of VC-backed firms and those 
firms that received incubation finance. We gauged employment growth as the log growth over the 
initial funding in the years between 2011 and 2014 (EMPLOYt0) compared with the number of 
employees in 2015 (EMPLOYt1). In regression models 3 and 4, we examined employment 
growth (EV_GROWTH) on the basis of work by Evans (1987), where EMPLOYt1 relates to the 
number of employees in 2015 and EMPLOYt0 relates to the number of employees in the year of 
the initial funding. Thus, t1−t0 computes the number of years between the initial year of funding 
and the reporting year 2015. 
Y1= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x7 +x8+ x9 + x10+x11+x12+x13  (1) 
Y1= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x8+ x10+x11+x12+x13 +x14 (2) 
Y2= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x7 +x8+ x9 + x10   (3) 
Y2= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x8+ x10+ x14   (4) 
 
 
Y1:EMPL_GROW Log (EMPLOYt1−EMPLOYt0) 
Y2:EV_GROWTH Log (EMPLOYt1/EMPLOYt0)/(t1−t0) 
X1:BERLIN Located in Berlin (1/0) 
X2:MUNICH Located in Munich (1/0) 
X3:ICT Portfolio firm is active in the information and communication 
industry (1/0) 
X4:ECOMMERCE Portfolio firm is active in wholesale, retail or e-commerce 
(1/0) 
X5:FINANCE Portfolio firm is active in financial services (1/0) 
X6:BIOTECH Portfolio firm is active in the life sciences (1/0) 
X7:PUBLIC_VC Portfolio firm received investment from at least one public VC 
firm (1/0)  
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X8:PRIVATE_ACCE Portfolio firm received investment from at least one private 
accelerator (1/0) 
X9:COMP_BUILD Portfolio firm received investment from at least one company 
builder (1/0) 
X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZE Number of employees in the year of initial financing 
X11:YEAR_2013 Initial year of financing (2013) (1/0) 
X12:YEAR_2012 Initial year of financing (2012) (1/0) 
X13: YEAR_2011 Initial year of financing (2011) (1/0) 
X14: BERLIN_CO_BU BERLIN_COMPANY_BUILDER 
N=322  
To test whether portfolio firms in Berlin and Munich, the two most important centres for VC in 
Germany, exhibited higher employment growth rates than firms outside of these clusters, the 
independent variables BERLIN and MUNICH were used. In cases where the portfolio firms were 
located in either Berlin or Munich, a 0 was assigned. If the firms were headquartered outside of 
Berlin or Munich, a 1 was coded. Four binary independent variables that tested for the effect of 
the industry in which the respective firms are operating were used. We examined whether there 
was a differential effect on employment growth rates across industries among information and 
communication technology firms (ICT); wholesale, retail and e-commerce firms (ECOMMERCE); 
financial services firms (FINANCE) and life sciences and biotechnology firms (BIOTECH). The 
classification of the portfolio firms draws on the work of Rammer et al. (2013) and is based on the 
industry codes reported for each firm (ICT services 58,2; 61 and 62; 63,01; 63,02; and 95,1; e-
commerce 46 and 47; financial services 64 to 66; Life Sciences 21; 26.3; 26.6; 32.50.1; 32.50.3; 
71.2; 72.11; 72.19; 86.10.1; and 86.10.3).  
In order to test for the effect of different types of investors on employment growth rates, four in-
dependent variables were used. More specifically, four binary variables were introduced that 
tested whether the portfolio firm had re-ceived finance from a company builder (COMP_BUILD), a 
private accelerator (PRIVATE_ACCE) or a public VC firm (PUBLIC_VC). To gauge the impact of 
Berlin-based company builders on firm growth, the interaction term between BERLIN and 
COMP_BUILD was computed (BERLIN_CO_BU). Due to multicollinearity between 
COMP_BUILD and BERLIN_CO_BU, two separate models were estimated that contained only 
one of the two variables.  
Several controls were used. In all models, we controlled for log firm size in the initial year of fi-
nance (LOG_FIRM_SIZE). In the first two models, the year of the initial financing was employed, 
that is, the years 2013, 2012, and 2011 (YEAR _2013, YEAR_2012, YEAR_2011); the year 2014 
was excluded. Because the year of the initial financing forms part of the dependent variable in 
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models 3 and 4 for the dependent variable EV_GROWTH, we did not control for the initial year of 
financing in these models. 
 
6 Results 
6.1 Descriptives 
For the dependent variables EMPLOY_GROW and EV_GROWTH, the respective median values 
were 2.46 and 1.13, with respective standard deviations of 1.39 and 0.86. For the four types of 
investors, we found varying median values, which provided an overview of these investors’ activi-
ty in the German VC market. At 53%, more than half the firms in the sample had received at least 
one financing round by a public VC firm in the years 2014 to  2011, and 8% of the portfolio firms 
received financing from a company builder, whereas private accelerators were invested in only 
2% of the firms in the sample. For 6% of the firms in the sample, a Berlin-based company builder 
was reported to be an investor. The number of initial financing rounds is relatively evenly spread 
across the years 2013 to 2011, in that 25% of the initial financing rounds were observed in 2013, 
24% in 2012 and 29% in 2011. The remaining 22% were documented in the year 2014.  
VC activity was strongly concentrated in selected metropolitan regions in that 40% of the firms in 
the sample were headquartered in Berlin, whereas 16% were located in Munich. Moreover, VC 
activity was also heavily concentrated in certain industry sectors. With 40% of the firms in the 
sample operating in the information and communication industry, this particular industry is clearly 
dominant. Whereas 12% of the portfolio firms belonged to the wholesale and retail (i.e. e-
commerce) industry, life science and biotechnology firms accounted for 10%. Financial services 
represented only 1.2% of the firms in the sample. 
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Table 2. Descriptives and Correlations (Models 1 and 2) 
 Mean STD Y1 X1  X2  X3 X4  X5 X6 X7  X8  X9 X10 X11  X12 X13 X14 
Y1: EM-
PLOY_GROW 
2.46 1.39 1 0.16** -0.18 0.02 0.22** 0.03 -0.10* -0.20** -0.02 0.24** 0.43** -0.06 0.13* 0.09 0.22* 
X1: BERLIN 0.39 0.48 0.16*
* 
1 -0.34** 0.23** 0.10** 0.02 -0.16** -0.11* 0.10** 0.21* 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.31** 
X2 :MUNICH 0.16 0.36 -0.18 0.34** 1 -0.12* 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 
X3:ICT 0.36 0.48 0.02 0.23** -0.12* 1 -0.26** -0.08 -0.26** -0.12 0.11* 0.09 -0.12* 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.11* 
X4:ECOMMERCE 0.11 0.31 0.22*
* 
0.10 0.03 -0.26** 1 -0.04 -0.12* -0.11* -0.04 0.11* 0.24** -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.11* 
X5:FINANCE 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 1 -0.04 -0.06 0.21** -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
X6:BIOTECH 0.11 0.31 -
0.10* 
-0.16** -0.01 -0.26** -0.12* -0.04 1 -0.13* -0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.04 
X7:PUBLIC_VC 0.53 0.50 -
0.20*
* 
-0.11* 0.01 -0.12* -0.11* -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.08 -0.19** -0.16** -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.16** 
X8:PRIVATE_ACCE 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.11* -0.04 0.21** -0.04 -0.08 1 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
X9:COMPANY_BUIL
D 
0.08 0.26 0.24*
* 
0.21** -0.02 0.09 0.11* -0.03 -0.06 -0.19** -0.03 1 0.13* -0.06 0.08 -0.03  
X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZ
E 
2.12 1.49 0.43*
* 
0.05 -0.05 -0.12* 0.22** -0.02 0.03 -0.16** -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.14* 0.05 0.11* 0.19** 
X11:YEAR_2013 0.25 0.43 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.14* 1 -0.32** -0.37** -0.05 
X12:YEAR_2012 0.24 0.42 0.13* 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.32** 1 -0.36** 0.04 
X13:YEAR_2011 0.29 0.45 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.11** -0.37** -0.36** 1 -0.04 
X14: BER-
LIN_CO_BU 
0.06 0.23 0.22*
* 
0.31** -0.10 0.11* 0.11* -0.02 -0.04 -0.16** -0.03  0.19** -0.05 .0.04 -0.04 1 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
N=322  
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Table 3. Descriptives and Correlations (Models 3 and 4) 
 Mean STD Y1 X1  X2  X3 X4  X5 X6 X7  X8  X9 X10 X14 
Y2: EV_GROWTH 1.13 0.86 1 0.18** -0.01 -0.01 0.15** 0.10 -0.11* -0.18** -0.01 0.19** 0.29** 0.23* 
X1: BERLIN 0.39 0.48 0.18** 1 -0.34** 0.23** 0.10** 0.02 -0.16** -0.11* 0.10** 0.21* 0.05 0.31* 
X2 :MUNICH 0.16 0.36 -0.01 0.34** 1 -0.12* 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 
X3:ICT 0.36 0.48 -0.01 0.23** -0.12* 1 -0.26** -0.08 -0.26** -0.12 0.11* 0.09 -0.12* 0.11* 
X4:ECOMMERCE 0.11 0.31 0.5** 0.10 0.3 -0.26** 1 -0.04 -0.12* -0.11* -0.04 0.11* 0.24** 0.11* 
X5:FINANCE 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 1 -0.04 -0.06 0.21** -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
X6:BIOTECH 0.11 0.31 -0.11* -0.16** -0.01 -0.26** -0.12* -0.04 1 -0.13* -0.04 -006 0.03 -0.04 
X7:PUBLIC_VC 0.53 0.50 -0.18** -0.11* 0.01 -0.12* -0.11* -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.08 -0.19** -0.16** -0.16** 
X8:PRIVATE_ACCE 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11* -0.04 0.21** -0.04 -0.08 1 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
X9:COMPANY_BUILD 0.08 0.26 0.19** 0.21** -0.02 0.09 0.11* -0.03 -0.06 -0.19** -0.03 1 0.13*  
X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZE 2.12 1.49 0.29** 0.05 -0.05 -0.12* 0.22** -0.02 0.03 -0.16** -0.06 0.13* 1 0.19** 
X14: BERLIN_CO_BU 0.06 0.23 0.23** 0.31** -0.10 0.11* -0.11* -0.02 -0.04 -0.16** -0.03  0.19** 1 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
N =322
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6.2 Regression Results 
The regression results provide support for Hypothesis 1, predicting a positive relationship be-
tween portfolio firms that were backed by company builders as compared with firms that did not 
receive such funding. Models 1 and 3 exhibited a positive and significant relationship between 
COMP_BUILD and employment growth rates. At the same time, models 1, 3 and 4 indicated a 
negative and significant impact of public VC funding on firm growth, albeit model 2 did not provide 
support for this relationship. The negative impact observed here may be due to policy considera-
tions regarding the provision of finance to young firms, particularly those in the early stages of 
development, as well as in fields where the risk of product development is particularly high. At the 
same time, this seems to suggest that publicly-backed firms that do not succeed at attracting 
private or company builder funding exhibit less dynamic employment growth. However, more 
research will be needed to provide more concise answers to this matter. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
                                                               Regression coefficients (standard error) 
CONST 1.09 (0.22)*** 1.11 (0.22)*** 0.77 (0.12)*** 0.79 (0.12)*** 
X1: BERLIN 0.28 (0.15)* 0.27 (0.15)* 0.26 (0.10)** 0.23 (0.10)** 
X2: MUNICH 0.15 (0.19) 0.17 (0.19) 0.13 (0.13) 0.14 (0.13) 
X3: ICT 0.17 (0.16) 0.17 (0.16) -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) 
X4: ECOMMERCE 0.45 (0.23)** 0.46 (0.23)** 0.12 (0.15) 0.12 (0.15) 
X5: FINANCE 0.92 (0.62) 0.91 (0.62) 0.84 (0.42)** 0.84 (0.41)** 
X6: BIOTECH -0.28 (0.22) -0.29 (0.22) -0.20 (0.15) -0.21 (0.15) 
X7: PUBLIC_VC -0.27 (0.14)* -0.30 (0.14)* -0.15 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09)* 
X8: PRIVATE_ACCE -0.36 (0.,55) -0.38 (0.56) -0.21 (0.37) -0.20 (0.37) 
X9:  COMP_BUILD 0.66 (0.26)**  0.32 (0.17)*  
X10: LOG_FIRM_SIZE 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** 
X11: YEAR_2013 0.47 (0.19)** 0.47 (0.19)**   
X12: YEAR_2012 0.77 (0.19)*** 0.80 (0.19)***   
X13: YEAR_2011 0.69 (0.19)*** 0.70 (0.19)***   
X14: BERLIN_CO_BU  0.59 (0.30)**  0.47 (0,20)** 
N 322 322 322 322 
R2 30.9% 30.3% 16.1% 16.6% 
Corrected R2 28.0% 27.4% 13.4% 14.0% 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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The regression results also provide support for Hypothesis 2 focusing on the differential ef-
fectiveness of private accelerators and company builders. While we report a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between the involvement of company builders and employment growth in mod-
els 1 and 3, no such significant effect is reported for private accelerators.  
We predicted Berlin-based company builders to have a stronger impact on employment 
growth on their portfolio firms than other (Berlin-based) VC-backed start-ups. Both in model 2 and 
model 4 we report a positive and significant relationship between Berlin-based company builders 
and employment growth. The results suggest that portfolio firms backed by Berlin-based compa-
ny builder exhibited higher growth rates than other VC-backed firms in general as well as Berlin-
based firms in particular. While we observe a positive and significant effect between firm growth 
and being located in Berlin (so-called cluster effect), the company builder effect (0.47**) is greater 
than the cluster effect (0.23**). The results thus provide support for Hypothesis 3 suggesting that 
the company builder business model more effectively puts to use the resources and locational 
advantages available in Berlin including the relatively low commercial, real estate prices and la-
bour costs, the availability of qualified and young personnel as well a lack of company headquar-
ters and classic financial intermediaries.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between firms in the information and com-
munication industry as well as in e-commerce. Our results do not provide support for this hypoth-
esis as we find no significant relationship between the information and communication industry 
and employment growth. While we document a positive and significant effect of e-commerce on 
employment growth rates in models 1 and 2, models 3 and 4 do not support this finding. By con-
trast, in models 3 and 4 a positive and significant relationship is observed between financial ser-
vices and employment growth. As the industry affiliation is not stable across the different models, 
Hypothesis 4 must be rejected. While industry affiliation per se does not seem to be sufficient to 
explain differential employment growth rates, the types of investors involved in the financing of 
portfolio firms seem to provide a more meaningful explanation.  
 
7 Conclusion 
Over the course of the past ten years, private incubation financing has gained traction in 
Germany. On the one hand, as of 2010 private accelerators have become more widespread, 
which is also a result of increasing activities by strategic firms migrating into incubation finance. 
On the other hand, a boom in the number of company builders has been observed over the last 
years. An overview of the existing literature on company builders suggests that these investors 
developed in line with the structure of the financing and innovation system in the respective na-
tions. Against this backdrop, this study examined the determinants of employment growth among 
VC-backed firms with a particular focus on company builders as these investors are particularly 
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prominent in the German VC market. 20 company builders in total were documented and we es-
timate that funding by these investors amounted to 1.2 billion euros, doubling the investments by 
private VC investors in 2015. In order to gauge the impact of different types of investors on the 
employment growth of their portfolio firms as well as the role of the industry affiliation and location 
of the portfolio firms, four different regression models with 322 firms were estimated. The results 
indicate a positive and significant effect between the employment growth rates of firms backed by 
company builders (Hypothesis 1). By contrast, no such effect is observed for private accelerators 
(Hypothesis 2). As company builder activity in the German VC market is strongly concentrated on 
Berlin, we tested the relationship between Berlin-based company builders and employment 
growth rates (Hypothesis 3). We report a positive and significant effect of these company builders 
on firm growth exceeding the cluster effect, which we observe among Berlin-based firms. As the 
number of VC firms and supporting organizations surged in parallel with the establishment and 
the increasing activity of Berlin-based company builders, company builders seem to represent an 
important driver of the growth dynamic observed in Berlin’s start-up ecosystem. With respect to 
industry affiliation, we do not observe stable results that allow us to support our Hypothesis 4. 
While the first two models suggest a positive and significant impact of e-commerce firms and 
employment growth, the models 3 and 4 suggest such a relationship between financial services 
firms.  
It remains to be seen whether the success of company builders in Germany will spread in-
ternationally. The relatively low number of such investors in United States, in which they originat-
ed, does not seem to support this view. By contrast, we expect company builders to flourish and 
to be particularly effective in finance and innovation systems characterized by particular deficien-
cies. Many studies have shown the relative weakness of the German financial system compared 
to liberal market economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the 
German financial system has been undergoing a catch-up process over the last years in which 
company builders seem to be an important element. The German innovation system has been 
associated with an aversion for risk, excelling at incremental innovation and providing workers 
with long-term employment perspectives. As an institution, company builders reduce the risk for 
external investors as well as for entrepreneurs. At the same time, the company builders’ broad 
service portfolio including e.g. in IT-programming, marketing and recruitment proves to be highly 
effective in facilitating the serial formation of new ventures. Compared to more classic VC inves-
tors, company builders also allow firms to rapidly move along learning curves thus reducing time 
to market considerably. In light of these findings, it seems likely that company builders will have a 
place in the German innovation system in the future.    
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